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THE MYTH OF THE LIBERAL
NINTH CIRCUIT
Erwin Chemerinsky*
The popular image of the Ninth Circuit, often expressed in the
news media, is that it is a far left court that is reversed more often
than any other circuit in the country.' This is simply wrong. In the
October 2002 Term, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court in
2seventy-four percent of all of the cases it decided. The Supreme
Court reversed the Ninth Circuit in seventy-five percent of the cases
coming from that court.3 The year before, during the October 2001
Term, the statistics were almost identical: the Supreme Court
reversed the lower courts seventy-five percent of the time and the
Ninth Circuit was reversed seventy-six percent of the time.4 Among
all federal circuits, the Ninth Circuit is almost exactly at the median
among circuits in reversal rates.
During the October 2002 Term, some of the Supreme Court's
most important decisions affirmed the Ninth Circuit. For instance, in
Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington,5 the Supreme Court
* Sydney M. Irmas Professor of Public Interest Law, Legal Ethics, and
Political Science, University of Southern California. I want to thank Diidri
Wells and Annika Martin for their excellent research assistance. It should be
disclosed that I was co-counsel before the Ninth Circuit in some of the cases
discussed in this article, including Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S. Ct. 1166 (2003),
Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002), and Southwest
Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, No. 03-56498, 2003 WL
22175955 (9th Cir. Sept. 23, 2003).
1. See, e.g., Charlotte Allen, Pledge of Allegiance; "Under God": An
'Injury' with Almost No Victims, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2003, at M3 ("The 9th
Circuit is famous for its loopy, ultra-liberal rulings that run against the grain of
other federal courts and are often overturned by the Supreme Court.").
2. See Marcia Coyle, 2002-2003 Term: Supreme Court Review, NAT'L
L.J., Aug. 4, 2003, at S 1.
3. See id
4. See Marcia Coyle, 2001-2002 Term: Supreme Court Review, NAT'L
L.J., Aug. 5, 2002, at C1.
5. 123 S. Ct. 1406 (2003).
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affirmed an en banc decision of the Ninth Circuit which had upheld
the constitutionality of state interest on lawyer trust account
programs.6 In Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs,7 the
Court affirmed a Ninth Circuit holding that state governments may
be sued for violating the Family and Medical Leave Act.8 Moreover,
when the Supreme Court reverses the Ninth Circuit, it often is in a 5-
4 decision, as in Lockyer v. Andrade,9 where the Court reversed a
Ninth Circuit decision granting a writ of habeas corpus to a person
who had been sentenced to life in prison, with no possibility of
parole for fifty years, for shoplifting $153 worth of videotapes.
10
Nevertheless, focusing on reversal rates is misleading and
irrelevant. The Supreme Court reviews only a very tiny proportion
of Ninth Circuit cases." More importantly, it is not the role of an
intermediate court of appeals to predict what the High Court
ultimately does. It is wrong to equate a reversal with a mistake by
the lower court. The Supreme Court gets the final word, but that
does not mean that its rulings are "right" and reversed lower courts
are "wrong." The issues that are decided by the Supreme Court are
inherently close and difficult questions about which reasonable
jurists can and do disagree. Several years ago, there was a Term in
which the Supreme Court reversed a very high percentage of Ninth
Circuit cases. Then Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Procter Hug
remarked, "The Supreme Court had a bad year that year."
To be sure, there are some judges now serving on the Ninth
Circuit who are more liberal than any on the current Supreme Court.
There is not a William Douglas or a William Brennan or a Thurgood
Marshall on the nation's highest court. But the Ninth Circuit has
judges like Stephen Reinhardt and Harry Pregerson who are quite
liberal.' 2  On the other hand, people often forget that, for every
6. See id,
7. 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003).
8. See id.
9. 123 S. Ct. 1166 (2003).
10. See id.
11. See Breakup of the 9th U.S. Circuit Court: Hearing on H.R. 1203
Before Comm. on House Judiciary Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and
Intellectual Prop., 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Judge Sidney R. Thomas,
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals).
12. See generally Jason Hoppin, Ninth Circuit Reversed Three Times in
One Day, THE RECORDER, Nov. 5, 2002, at 1 (naming Judge Harry Pregerson
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liberal on the Ninth Circuit, there is a judge who occupies the exact
opposite place on the ideological continuum. Conservative judges
such as Diarmuid O'Scannlain and Andrew Kleinfeld are just as
conservative as judges Reinhardt and Pregerson are liberal.
13
Likewise, for every moderate liberal on the Ninth Circuit, like
William Fletcher, there is a moderate conservative like Pamela
Rymer. 14  Moreover, many of the judges are unquestionably
moderates, who cannot be seen as leaning left or right.
Consequently, the identity of the panel is enormously important
in the Ninth Circuit. When someone tells me that they are about to
argue a case before the Ninth Circuit, I immediately ask, "Who is the
panel?" But this is so in virtually every circuit in the nation; every
circuit has judges across the political spectrum and the identity of the
bench is enormously important in determining the outcome of many
cases. Nor is this new or to be lamented. The identity of the judges
always has mattered and especially so in these deeply ideologically
divided times. There is no way to construct a human system in
which value choices must be made that will not depend on who
occupies the positions.
In this foreword, I want to illustrate my thesis by pointing to
both the conservative and the liberal sides of the Ninth Circuit in the
last year. I have no doubt that the outcome in these high profile
cases might well have been different if only the "luck of the draw"
had produced different panels. As the remainder of this Loyola Law
Review issue discusses a number of recent Ninth Circuit cases, I
want to illustrate my thesis by pointing to a few of the cases, likely
among the most high profile of the last year: those concerning the
as "one of the Ninth Circuit's most liberal jurists"); David G. Savage, The
Nation Justices to Test Refusal to Hire over Drug Use, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 25,
2003, at A12 (describing Judge Stephen Reinhardt as the "liberal leader of the
9th Circuit").
13. See generally Maura Dolan, The Recall Campaign, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
20, 2003, at A16 (stating that Judges Reinhardt and Pregerson are "considered
among the most conservative members of the 9th Circuit").
14. See generally Jason Hoppin, Abortion Foes Lose on 1st Amendment,
THE RECORDER, May 17, 2002, at 1 (stating that Judge Pamela Rymer is
considered to be a moderate); The Year of the Obstructionists with Senate
Stalling: Clinton Should Push His Court Nominations, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9,
1996, at B4 ("William Fletcher, a Boalt Hall law professor nominated to
California's 9th Circuit, has been widely praised for his.., moderate
leanings.").
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detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; the California recall election;
the meaning of the Second Amendment; and the Pledge of
Allegiance.
My greatest fear is that the myth of the liberal Ninth Circuit
might influence, consciously or unconsciously, some judges on that
court to be more cautious and more conservative in their rulings. I
have long believed that the constant conservative attacks on the
"liberal press" have caused the media to bend over backwards to
prove that it is not liberal. Similarly, I worry that the human beings
who serve as judges of the Ninth Circuit may want to show that they
are not liberal by being more conservative in their rulings, especially
in high profile cases.
I. HARDLY A LIBERAL COURT
As a lawyer who often handles civil liberties and civil rights
cases before the Ninth Circuit, I have been astounded to hear it
described as an activist left-wing court. To illustrate, I want to
discuss two cases in which I was co-counsel, which were among the
Ninth Circuit's most high profile decisions of the year.
In Coalition of Clergy v. Bush,15 the Ninth Circuit held that a
coalition of clergy members, lawyers, and professors did not have
standing to argue that the United States Government is violating
American and international law in its treatment of detainees in
Guantanamo. 16 The usual rule is that individuals only may assert
their own rights in a federal court and cannot present the claims of
others, of third parties.' 7 But the Supreme Court repeatedly has held
that the ban on third-party standing is prudential, not constitutional.'
8
As a prudential standing rule, Congress, by statute, can override it
and authorize third-party standing.
19
15. 310F.3d 1153 (9thCir. 2002).
16. See id.
17. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) ("The plaintiff
generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his
claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.").
18. See United Food & Commercial Workers v. Brown Group, 517 U.S.
544, 557 (1996); Warth, 422 U.S. at 499.
19. See, e.g., Dep't of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525
U.S. 316, 328 (1999) (Congress has eliminated any prudential concerns by
enacting a specific statute that authorizes standing); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S.
154, 162 (1997) ("unlike their constitutional counterparts, [prudential standing
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That is exactly what Congress did in 28 U.S.C. § 2242. The
statute could not be clearer in authorizing third-party standing; it
states that a habeas corpus petition can be filed "by the person for
whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in his behalf"2 °
There are no qualifiers or limits within the statute. 21 Congress's
obvious concern was that the government might arrest people and
hold them without access to the courts. Unless it is possible to bring
a habeas corpus petition on their behalf, no relief would be possible
and there would be no way to insist that the government follow the
law.
The Coalition of Clergy, Lawyers, and Professors filed a habeas
corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California, alleging that the United States Government
violated basic principles of international human rights law by
forcibly removing prisoners of war from Afghanistan, transporting
them to Guantanamo, and holding them indefinitely in small outdoor
22cages. They alleged that the United States Government is violating
the requirements of both the United States Constitution and treaties
binding on the United States by continuing to hold these individuals
in Guantanamo Bay without any semblance of due process.23 The
habeas petition alleged that the prisoners in Guantanamo Bay have
no access to the courts.24  The Government never disclosed the
prisoners' identity; never provided attorneys to them; never gave
them means for filing an action on their own behalf.
25
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
however, affirmed the dismissal of the case on the ground that the
members of the Coalition of Clergy lack a relationship with the
detainees. 26 The court stated:
requirements] can be modified or abrogated by Congress"); LAURENCE TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 387 (3d ed. 2000) ("Congress may by
statute eliminate prudential standing concerns.").
20. 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (2002) (emphasis added).
21. See id.
22. See Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 3-5, Coalition of
Clergy v. Bush, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (C.D. Cal. 2002), affd in part, vacated
in part, 310 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002).
23. See id. 3-4.
24. See Coalition of Clergy, 310 F.3d at 1156.
25. See id.
26. Seeid. at 1162.
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We accept the Coalition's concern for the rights and
welfare of the detainees at Camp X-Ray as genuine and
sincere. Nevertheless, it has failed to demonstrate any
relationship with the detainees, generally or individually.
We therefore must conclude that even assuming the
detainees are unable to litigate on their own behalf and even
under the most relative interpretation of the "significant
relationship" requirement the Coalition lacks next-friend
standing.
27
There are several flaws with the court's conclusion. First, the
statute, section 2242, does not contain any such requirement of a
close relationship. Where the statutory language is clear, as it is here
in permitting this habeas petition, there should be no need for further
analysis.28
Second, the Supreme Court never has interpreted section 2242
as requiring a close relationship. No Supreme Court case ever has
held that section 2242 allows habeas petitions to be brought on
behalf of others only when there is a close relationship between the
petitioner and the detained individual. In fact, even the Supreme
Court decision relied on by the district court does not state such a
requirement. In Whitmore v. Arkansas,29 the Court articulated the
requirements for "next friend" standing:
First, a next friend must provide an adequate explanation-
such as the inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other
disability-why the real party in interest cannot appear on
his own behalf to prosecute the action. Second, the next
friend must be truly dedicated to the best interests of the
person on whose behalf he seeks to litigate and it has been
further suggested that a next friend must have some
significant relationship with the real party in interest.
In other words, Whitmore v. Arkansas states just two
requirements: (1) an adequate explanation for why the real party in
27. Id. at 1153, 1162-63.
28. See United States v. Trident Seafoods Corp., 92 F.3d 855, 862 (9th Cir.
2000) ("If the statutory language is clear, we need look no further than that
language in determining the meaning of the statute."); Hellon & Assocs., Inc.
v. Phoenix Resort Corp., 958 F.2d 295, 297 (9th Cir. 1992).
29. 495 U.S. 149 (1990).
30. Id. at 163-164.
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interest cannot appear on his own behalf; and (2) the next friend
being dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose behalf
the petition is brought.31
Here, the petitioners should have sufficient standing because the
two requirements for "next friend" under Whitmore v. Arkansas are
satisfied.32  But the Court of Appeals takes the language from
Whitmore, that it has been "suggested" that there be a close
relationship, and turns it into a rigid requirement. 33 No Supreme
Court decision has ever dismissed a "next friend" standing for lack
of a close relationship when the two requirements stated in Whitmore
were met.
Third, no Ninth Circuit case prior to Coalition of Clergy v. Bush
has ever denied next friend standing in a situation where the
individuals were being held without access to the courts. The court
relied on language in Massie ex rel. Kroll v. Woodford,34 that "the
next friend [have] some close relationship" with the petitioner.35 But
in Massie, the court dismissed the habeas petition because the
prisoner could present his own petition, if he so desired, in federal
court.36 Massie involved a journalist who filed a habeas corpus
petition on behalf of a man on death row who chose not to challenge
his impending execution.37 This Court stressed that there was no
need for next friend standing because the prisoner could bring his
own habeas corpus petition.38 Obviously, the facts in Massie are
distinguishable from this situation in which individuals from a
foreign nation are being held without access to lawyers and to the
courts.
Indeed, every Ninth Circuit case that has rejected "next friend"
standing involves a situation in which the individual was deemed
able to bring the petition for him or herself.39 Thus, the language in
31. See id. at 163-64.
32. See Coalition of Clergy, 310 F.3d at 1162-63.
33. See id. at 1159, 1161-62.
34. 244 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 2001).
35. Id. at 1194.
36. See id. at 1193-94.
37. See id. at 1195.
38. See id. at 1196.
39. See, e.g., Brewer v. Lewis, 989 F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 1993) (mother
lacked standing to bring habeas petition for her son because she failed to
provide meaningful evidence that her son was incompetent to appear on his
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Massie about the need for a close relationship is merely dictum that
describes a situation not relevant to that case. Neither the
Government nor the district court point to a single case in which a
court denied "next friend" standing for those representing prisoners
who lacked access to the courts.
Even more astounding is Judge Marsha Berzon's concurring
opinion.40 She wrote separately to say that the court did not need to
address whether a significant relationship is always necessary and
were the court to address that question, she "would be inclined to
hold that a significant relationship is not always necessary."'41 Judge
Berzon said that the Coalition of Clergy failed to show the
Guantanamo detainees' lack of access to the courts, and that the
Coalition failed to try communicating with them.42
No one is allowed to visit the detainees in Guantanamo because
travel to Cuba is illegal and Guantanamo is a closed military base.
Those being held are not accorded any means of communication and
the government has refused to provide them attorneys.43
The detainees are individuals from a foreign nation, most of
whom likely do not speak English. They have no access to the courts
in any way whatsoever. The absence of any lawsuit by the vast
majority of them shows the flaw in Judge Berzon's argument. Why
would those detainees in cages bring no challenge? Certainly it is
not that they are pleased with their captivity. One prisoner yelled at
a reporter being given a tour around the perimeter of the
Guantanamo base:
We need the world to know about us. We are innocent here
in this place. We've got no legal rights. Nothing. So can
own behalf); Wilson v. Dixon, 256 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1958) (habeas petition
denied because of failure to allege why inmate could not bring his own
petition).
40. See Coalition of Clergy, 310 F.3d at 1165 (Berzon, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 1153, 1165 (Berzon, J., concurring).
42. See id. at 1166-68 (Berzon, J., concurring).
43. See Paisley Dodds, U.S.: No Lawyers for War Captives, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 17, 2002 ("In its latest rebuff to the demands for an independent body to
decide the legal status of captives held here, the United States and detainees
have no right to lawyers, and can be held as long as the U.S.-led war on
terrorism lasts.").
[Vol. 37:1
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somebody know about us? Can you tell the world about
us?"
Those being held in cages in Guantanamo have not filed suit
because the government will not allow them to communicate with
lawyers and because they have no way to file a lawsuit on their own.
Judge Berzon and the majority expressed great concern that the
Petitioners did not communicate directly with those in
Guantanamo.45 But the judges offered no explanation for how
Petitioners could do this. Travel by Americans to Cuba is prohibited.
Even if Petitioners went to Cuba, Guantanamo is closed to the
public. There is obviously no chance that Petitioners would be
allowed access to the detainees. Moreover, there is no way to
communicate with them because their names have not been released.
Surely, the failure to communicate directly with the detainees cannot
be used to support the government's motion to dismiss when it is the
government that is preventing all communication.
Under the literal language of the habeas statute, and its clear
purpose in allowing next friend standing, the court should have
accorded standing to the Coalition of Clergy to sue on behalf of those
being held in Guantanamo. At the very least, the case belies the
view that the Ninth Circuit is a liberal activist court.
The other case that I want to discuss, which belies the image of a
liberal Ninth Circuit, is its most visible case of the last year:
46Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley. California
voters signed petitions to hold a recall election for the Governor of
California.47 Shortly after the Lieutenant Governor of California, in
accord with the state Constitution, set the recall election for October
7, 2003, civil rights organizations-the Southwest Voter Registration
Education Project, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference of
Greater Los Angeles, and the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People, California State Conference
Branches-filed a lawsuit challenging the use of punchcard
44. Katharine Q. Seelye, A Nation Challenged: Captives; An Uneasy
Routine at Cuba Prison Camp, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2002, at A8.
45. See Coalition of Clergy, 310 F.3d at 1162, 1165.
46. No. 03-56498, 2003 WL 22175955 (9th Cir. Sept. 23, 2003).
47. See id.
Fall 2003]
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machines in some counties of California while other counties used
far better voting technology.48
Voters in six California counties, comprising forty-four percent
of the State's population, used punchcard voting machines. 49 The
evidence in the record of the case was clear that these machines were
far less reliable than all other voting systems used throughout the
state. For example, the Declaration of Henry Brady50 stated:
The use of punchcards will significantly increase the rate of
residual votes (i.e., invalid ballots) as compared to other
technologies. Comparing punchcard counties versus non-
punchcard counties in California in 2000 demonstrates that
the residual vote rate is 1.34 percent higher in punchcard
counties .... [C]ounties using punchcards have, on
average, a residual vote rate about one and one-half
percentage points higher than those using other-systems.
5 1
In other words, those who voted in the counties using punchcard
systems-Los Angeles, Mendocino, Sacramento, San Diego, Santa
Clara, and Solano-had a substantially greater likelihood that their
votes did not count than those in all other counties in the state. Dr.
Brady explained that in light of the projected voter turnout,
approximately 40,000 votes cast in these counties will not be
counted, which could have been larger than the margin of victory in
this unprecedented election.52 Indeed, the Secretary of State had
"decertified" punchcard machines and prohibited their use after
March 1, 2004. 53
The plaintiffs claimed that this discrepancy in voting means both
violates the right to vote for those whose ballots are not counted and
denies equal protection to those who live in counties using punchcard
48. See id.
49. See Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, No. 03-
56498, 2003 WL 22119858, at **1, 4 (9th Cir. Sept. 15, 2003), rev'don reh'g
en banc, 2003 WL 22175955 (9th Cir. Sept. 23, 2003).
50. Robson Professor of Political Science and Public Policy, University of
California, Berkeley.
51. Decl. of Henry Brady at 3, 9, Southwest Voter Registration Educ.
Project v. Shelley, No. 03-56498, 2003 WL 22001185 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 20,
2003) (No. 03-56498), rev'd, 2003 WL 22119858 (9th Cir. Sept. 15, 2003),
rev'd on reh'g en banc, 2003 WL 22175955 (9th Cir. Sept. 23, 2003)
[hereinafter Declaration of Henry Brady].
52. Seeid. at 13, 44.
53. See Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project, 2003 WL 22175955.
(Vol. 37:1
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systems because of the greater likelihood that their ballots will be
discarded. 54 As the Supreme Court explained in Gray v. Sanders:
55
"The Court has consistently recognized that all qualified voters have
a constitutionally protected right to cast their ballots and have them
counted.... Every voter's vote is entitled to be counted once. It
must be correctly counted and reported.,5 6 The Court explained that
this "conception of political equality [stems] from the Declaration of
Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth,
Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments." 57  Relying on these
basic principles, the United States Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore
58
held that treating similar voters differently within a state violates
equal protection because "[h]aving once granted the right to vote on
equal terms, the State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate
treatment, value one person's vote over that of another." 59 Yet, it is
indisputable that many who live in counties using punchcard
machines did not have their vote "counted once," or "correctly
counted and reported"; many had their ballots treated differently
from others in the state solely because of the accident of their
residency.
In addition to this equal protection violation, the plaintiffs
contended that the punchcard systems discriminate against minority
voters. Counties using punchcard systems have substantially more
citizens of color than counties using other systems. Moreover, Dr.
Brady explains that "minorities have much higher residual vote rates
than non-minorities in punchcard counties., 62 Thus, eliminating
punchcard machines would have "reduce[d] the especially high
residual vote rates among minorities compared to non-minorities by
about one to two percentage points.
63
54. See id.
55. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
56. Id. at 380 (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
57. Id. at 381.
58. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
59. Id. at 104-05.
60. See Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, No. 03-
56498, 2003 WL 22175955 (9th Cir. Sept. 23, 2003).
61. See Declaration of Henry Brady, supra note 51, at 3, 10. See
generally http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06/06037.html (population
statistics by county).
62. Declaration of Henry Brady, supra note 51, at 12, 40.
63. Id. at 10, 37.
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Any voting practice which ensures that minorities have a greater
chance than Whites of their votes not being counted violates section
2 of the Voting Rights Act.64 As the Supreme Court explained,
section 2 prohibits "any... practices or procedures which result in
the denial or abridgement of the right to vote of any citizen who is a
member of a protected class of racial and language minorities. '65 As
the Ninth Circuit Court recently stated, "Section 2 plainly provides
that a voting practice or procedure violates the [Voting Rights Act]
when a plaintiff is able to show, based on the totality of
circumstances, that the challenged voting practice results in
discrimination on account of race." 66  The evidence was that
punchcard machines will have exactly this effect, causing
proportionately more voters of color to be denied the right to have
their votes counted.67
On August 20, 2003, the United States District Court for the
Central District of California ruled against the plaintiffs and issued
an order and opinion denying their request for a preliminary
injunction.68 However, on September 15, 2003, a three judge panel
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed
the District Court and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. 69 The panel
found that it would violate equal protection to treat similar voters in
California differently solely based on the accident of geography.7 °
The panel relied heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v.
Gore to support its conclusion.7'
A Ninth Circuit judge, sua sponte, requested a vote as to
whether en banc review should be granted.72 The court announced
on Friday, September 19, 2003, that it would hear the case en banc.73
The hearing was held on Monday, September 22, and the decision
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000).
65. Thornburgh v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43 (1986).
66. Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1017 (9th Cir. 2003).
67. See Declaration of Henry Brady, supra note 51, at 3, 9-12.
68. See Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, No. 03-
56498, 2003 WL 22001185 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2003).
69. See id.
70. See Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project, 2003 WL 22119858, at
*27.
71. See Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project, 2003 WL 22175955
(relying on Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000)).
72. See Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project, 2003 WL 22176200.
73. See id.
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reversing the District Court was announced the next day at 9:00 a.m.
The court, in a per curiam opinion without dissent, reversed the
panel.74
The en banc decision disagreed with the panel's conclusion that
equal protection was violated primarily on the grounds that it could
not be said that the District Court abused its discretion in denying a
preliminary injunction.75  The entirety of the Ninth Circuit's
discussion of the equal protection claim was the following statement:
We have not previously had occasion to consider the
precise equal protection claim raised here. That a panel of
this court unanimously concluded the claim had merit
provides evidence that the argument is one over which
reasonable jurists may differ. In Bush v. Gore, the leading
case on disputed elections, the court specifically noted:
'The question before the Court is not whether local entities,
in the exercise of their expertise, may develop different
systems for implementing elections.' We conclude the
district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the
plaintiffs have not established a clear probability of success
on the merits of their equal protection claim.76
In other words, the Ninth Circuit reversed the panel's conclusion
about equal protection solely on the ground that the District Court
did not abuse its discretion. However, this is flat out inconsistent
with the Court's statement earlier in its opinion:
The district court's interpretation of the underlying legal
principles, however, is subject to de novo review and a
district court abuses its discretion when it makes an error of
law. Thus we have held that an order 'will be reversed only
if the district court relied on an erroneous legal premise or
abused its discretion.'
77
The law in the Ninth Circuit is clear that the issues of law
underlying a district court's decision denying a preliminary
74. See Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project, 2003 WL 22175955.
75. See id. at *3.
76. Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project, 2003 WL 22175955, at *3
(citations omitted).
77. Id. at *2.
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injunction are reviewed de novo.78 The Ninth Circuit thus was
wrong in overruling the panel's equal protection analysis based
solely on the standard of review. It was inappropriate to affirm the
District Court for not abusing its discretion when the Court of
Appeals was required to face the question of whether, as a matter of
law, the District Court erred in its equal protection analysis. The
Ninth Circuit offered no analysis whatsoever of why the three judge
panel was wrong in its conclusion that equal protection would be
violated by using punchcard machines in some counties and better
technology in other places.
The Ninth Circuit then went on to consider the Voting Rights
Act claim. 79  The court said: "Plaintiffs have made a stronger
showing on their Voting Rights Act claim."80 However, the Ninth
Circuit rejected this based on its balancing of the equities involved:
We therefore must determine whether the district court
abused its discretion in weighing the hardships and
considering the public interest. In this case, hardship falls
not only upon the putative defendant, the California
Secretary of State, but on all the citizens of California,
because this case concerns a statewide election. The public
interest is significantly affected .... Interference with
impending elections is extraordinary and interference with
an election after voting has begun is unprecedented. If the
recall election scheduled for October 7, 2003, is enjoined, it
is certain that the state of California and its citizens will
suffer material hardship by virtue of the enormous
resources already invested in reliance on the election's
proceeding on the announced date. Time and money have
been spent to prepare voter information pamphlets and
sample ballots, mail absentee ballots, and hire and train poll
workers. Public officials have been forced to divert their
attention from their official duties in order to campaign.
Candidates have crafted their message to the voters in light
78. See Idaho Sporting Cong., Inc. v. Alexander, 222 F.3d 562, 565 (9th
Cir. 2000); Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174
F.3d 1036, 1046 (9th Cir. 1999); Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629,
634-35 (9th Cir. 1998).
79. See Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project, 2003 WL 22175955.
80. Id. at *3.
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of the originally-announced schedule and calibrated their
message to the political and social environment of the time.
They have raised funds under current campaign
contribution laws and expended them in reliance on the
election's taking place on October 7. Potential voters have
given their attention to the candidates' messages and
prepared themselves to vote. Hundreds of thousands of
absentee voters have already cast their votes in similar
reliance upon the election going forward on the timetable
announced by the state. These investments of time, money,
and the exercise of citizenship rights cannot be returned. If
the election is postponed, citizens who have already cast a
vote will effectively be told that the vote does not count and
that they must vote again. In short, the status quo that
existed at the time the election was set cannot be restored
because this election has already begun.
81
There are several flaws in this argument. First, there is no doubt
that a federal court has the power to order that constitutionally
adequate voting machines be used and to delay the election, if
necessary, until they are available. The Supreme Court has expressly
stated: "If time presses too seriously, the District Court has the
power appropriately to extend the time limitations imposed by state
law."
82
In fact, the Supreme Court repeatedly has approved delaying an
election when it is necessary to ensure compliance with the Voting
Rights Act. The Court stated: "If a voting change subject to section
5 has not been precleared, section 5 plaintiffs are entitled to an
injunction prohibiting implementation of the change." 83 Similarly, in
Clark v. Roemer8 4 the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he District Court
81. Id. (citations omitted).
82. Sixty-Seventh Minn. State Senate v. Beens, 406 U.S. 187, 201 (1972).
83. Lopez v. Monterey County, California, 519 U.S. 9, 20, 22 (1996)
(reversing failure to enjoin a California county election even though "simply
enjoining the elections would leave the County without a judicial election
system").
84. 500 U.S. 646 (1991).
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should have enjoined the elections." 85 Other courts have likewise
enjoined elections and election procedures.
86
Second, the Ninth Circuit undoubtedly is correct that there
would have been additional costs to delaying the election. But what
the court failed to explain is why these were more important than
protecting the fundamental right to vote, especially for minority
voters under the Voting Rights Act. The Ninth Circuit stressed that a
delayed election would not be the same as one on October 7. The
problem with this argument is that it means that the choice is
between two elections: one on October 7, with voting machines that
surely will not count a significant number of votes, or an election on
a later day when constitutionally adequate voting systems could have
been in place in all of the counties. Thus, under the Ninth Circuit's
analysis, there is a choice between two unique moments in time: one
with, and the other without, punchcard voting machines; one with,
and the other without, a denial of equal protection and a violation of
the Voting Rights Act. The public interest is better served by the
latter, an election on the recall and the two ballot initiatives that best
ensures that every person's ballot will be counted.
Bush v. Gore powerfully demonstrates that the judiciary must be
involved in the election process, even when it means that a court
essentially will decide a presidential election, to ensure that the
requirements of equal protection are met. No one denied that
delaying an election, especially one attracting as much media
attention as the recall election, is an extraordinary remedy. But it is
an essential remedy, which serves the public interest, when the
alternative is an election in which it is known in advance that 40,000
votes, primarily of minority voters, will not be counted.
At the very least, decisions like those in Coalition of Clergy v.
Bush and Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley
85. Id. at 655; See also Lopez, 519 U.S. at 20, 22. (reversing failure to
enjoin a California county election even though "simply enjoining the elections
would leave the County without a judicial election system").
86. See, e.g., Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 777 (9th Cir.
1990) (noting that "[a] motions panel ... entered an order which had the effect
of staying the Country's election procedures pending our decision"); Haith v.
Martin, 618 F. Supp. 410, 414 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (enjoining election of superior
court judges in the absence of pre-clearance for changed election procedures),
aff'd without opinion, 477 U.S. 901 (1986).
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refute the claim that the Ninth Circuit is an overwhelmingly liberal
court.
II. THE MORE LIBERAL SIDE OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Probably the two most important liberal decisions from the
Ninth Circuit in the past year were the cases involving the Pledge of
Allegiance and the meaning of the Second Amendment. In Newdow
v. United States Congress,87 the Ninth Circuit held that the words
"under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance violated the Establishment
Clause in public schools. 88 The Ninth Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, had
earlier ruled in the case that the words "under God" in the Pledge of
Allegiance infringed the Establishment Clause.89  The panel,
however, sua sponte, issued an amended superseding opinion.9 The
revised opinion focused exclusively on the public school context.
91
The court applied the test from Lemon v. Kurtzman,92 and held
that having teachers lead the recitation of the Pledge containing the
words "under God" violated the Establishment Clause.93 The court
explained that there was coercion on children, just as with voluntary
prayer in schools. 94 The court said that the statement in the Pledge
that the United States is a nation "under God" is a profession of
religious belief, namely a belief in monotheism.
95
Although the decision has been enormously controversial, the
Ninth Circuit was correct. Imagine if the Pledge said, "One Nation
under Jesus." Surely few would deny that such a phrase would
violate the Establishment Clause. The phrase, "one Nation under
God," is just as offensive to those who do not believe in a theistic
God as the phrase "one nation under Jesus" is to non-Christians. Nor
is it an answer that this is just ceremonial religion, like the words "In
God We Trust" on money or the statement, "God save this honorable
87. 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003).
88. See Id. at 490; see also 4 U.S.C. § 4.
89. See Nedow v. U.S. Cong., 292 F.3d 597, 612 (9th Cir. 2002), amended
by 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Nedow, 2003 WL 2134177 (U.S. Oct. 14, 2003).
90. See Nedow, 328 F.3d at 482-90.
91. See id.
92. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
93. See Nedow, 328 F.3d at 488.
94. See id. at 486-87.
95. See id.
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Court" before Supreme Court sessions. The difference is that no one
is asked, let alone pressured, to recite those phrases; children in
public school are pressured to state the Pledge of Allegiance each
day.
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit was correct to apply the Lemon test.
In Lemon, the Court declared: "First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute
must not foster an excessive government entanglement with
religion. 96 A law is unconstitutional if it fails any prong of the
Lemon test. Although some Justices have criticized the Lemon test,
97
the Supreme Court has not overruled it and continues to apply it in
determining whether government actions violate the Establishment
Clause.98 The Ninth Circuit, of course, continues to follow and apply
the Lemon test.
99
Under the Lemon test, the words "under God" in the Pledge of
Allegiance are clearly unconstitutional. There is no secular purpose
to reciting such religious words. In fact, the phrase "one nation
under God" was added to the Pledge of Allegiance in 1954 as part of
the Cold War fight against "godless communism."'100 Nor is there a
secular effect to having students recite the words "under God."
Some Justices, such as Justice O'Connor, have emphasized whether
the government is "symbolically endorsing" religion in determining
what is an impermissible effect of advancing religion.' 10 Having the
government ask students to recite the words "under God" is a clear
message of government endorsement for religion. Children do feel
96. Id. at 612 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
97. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508
U.S. 384, 399 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
98. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232 (1997).
99. See, e.g., Amer. Family Ass'n v. City & County of San Francisco, 277
F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2002); Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc'y of
Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 1999).
100. See David G. Savage, The Nation, High Court to Consider "One
Nation, Under God" Petition, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2002, at Al.
101. See County of Allegheny v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,
627 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
("As a theoretical matter, the endorsement test captures the essential command
of the Establishment Clause, namely, 'that government must not... [convey] a
message that religion or a particular religion is favored or preferred."').
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pressure to recite the Pledge and the words "under God," just as they
feel pressure to participate in school prayers.
0 2
Another major liberal victory in the Ninth Circuit in the last year
was in Silveira v. Lockyer. 0 3 The case involved a challenge to the
California Assault Weapons Control Act that significantly
strengthened restrictions on possession, use, and transfer of assault
weapons. 0 4 The Ninth Circuit upheld the law and discussed the
meaning of the Second Amendment in a lengthy opinion. 105 The
court said that the Second Amendment right to "bear arms"
guarantees the right of the people to maintain effective state militias,
but does not provide any type of individual right to own or possess
weapons. 10 6 The court concluded that federal and state governments
have the authority to enact prohibitions and restrictions on the use
and possession of firearms, subject only to generally applicable
constitutional constraints, such as due process and equal
protection. 10 7 The court said that the Second Amendment imposes
no limit on dangerous weapons such as assault rifles.
10 8
In Nordyke v. King, 0 9 other judges of the Ninth Circuit went out
of their way, in dicta, to express their disagreement with the views
expressed in Silveira.10 Nordyke involved a suit by gun show
promoters challenging a county ordinance prohibiting possession of
firearms on government property."' The Ninth Circuit upheld the
ordinance and rejected the constitutional challenge; the court said
that prohibiting gun shows regulated commercial transactions, not
speech." 2  Judge Gould, "specially concurring," expressed his
disagreement with the decision in Silveira, and said that he believes
102. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (invalidating school prayers, in part, because of
inherent coercion).
103. 312 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2002), reh'g en banc denied, 328 F.3d 567 (9th
Cir. 2003).
104. See id.
105. See id. at 1060-87.
106. See id. at 1086-87.
107. See id. at 1087.
108. See id.
109. 319 F.3d 1185 (9th Cir. 2003).
110. See id. at 1192 n.4.
111. Seeid. at 1187-88.
112. See id. at 1189-91.
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that the Second Amendment protects an individual's right to possess
firearms. 113
There is no doubt that the judges in Silveira went out of their
way to issue a broad opinion on the meaning of the Second
Amendment. First, the judges assumed that the Second Amendment
applies to state and local governments, an assumption unwarranted
by any Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit precedent. No court ever has
held that the Second Amendment is incorporated into the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The easiest way for the Ninth
Circuit to have disposed of the Second Amendment challenge to the
state law would have been to hold that the provision only applies to
the federal government. Second, the last decision of the United
States Supreme Court concerning the Second Amendment, United
States v. Miller,"14 expressly held that the provision does not
safeguard an individual's right to have firearms. 1 5 No Supreme
Court decision has reconsidered this holding, and that should have
been sufficient to decide the case. Third, even if the Second
Amendment protects an individual right, it surely is not absolute.
Restrictions on who has assault weapons would be justified no matter
how the Second Amendment is interpreted. A petition for certiorari
was filed in the Supreme Court in June 2003, and the Court will
announce whether it will be hearing the case in the fall of 2003.
III. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to generalize or even find themes in the work of
any court of appeals, let alone one that consists of 26 judges with
active status and numerous senior judges. Yet, the media constantly
generalizes and portrays the Ninth Circuit as a liberal court out of the
mainstream. By any measure, this is simply wrong. Statistics show
that the Ninth Circuit is not reversed more than the national average
for Supreme Court reversal of lower courts. Moreover, in its most
high profile cases sometimes it rules in a fashion liberals would
applaud, but sometimes it decides in a way that conservatives would
favor. The only accurate generalization that can be made about the
113. Id. at 1192-98 (Gould, J., specially concurring).
114. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
115. See id. at 178.
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Ninth Circuit is that its judges are ideologically diverse and the
outcome of cases often depends on the identity of the panel.
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